Political insecurity and locust management

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Since the late 1980s, locust management has advanced considerably with the adoption of modern communication systems and computerized data integration for monitoring and forecasting. Despite these technical gains, persistent human-related challenges remain significant, complex, and deeply rooted. In Kenya’s 2019–2021 locust campaign, 70 percent of the obstacles were estimated to be human in nature, involving staffing, coordination, funding, politics, and sociocultural factors, demonstrating that human constraints outweighed technological or geographical ones.

Human caused impediments include entrenched conceptual paradigms, security challenges, political interference, weak communication among stakeholders, declining donor engagement, blurred boundaries between emergency and development objectives, loss of institutional memory, inadequate training, and poor responsiveness. These factors are critical because they sustain systemic unpreparedness and hinder progress toward integrated, anticipatory, and sustainable locust management, thereby influencing the initiation, magnitude, and duration of desert locust crises. See the vicious cycle of locust outbreak to read more about how these factors perpetuate themselves.

Direct and indirect impacts of political insecurity in locust management

These human and institutional weaknesses become even more consequential in areas where insecurity directly limits access to key breeding zones. Most countries that contain desert locust breeding zones, experience varying forms of insecurity, including conflict, rebellion, terrorism, and the presence of land mines. This type of insecurity often prevents field teams from conducting surveys or spray campaigns, limits access to breeding areas, and hinders communication and the flow of information between national and regional control units. Swarms originating in non-contested zones may also move into conflict areas, where they become inaccessible to control operations.

Beyond such direct impacts, indirect insecurity can be equally or more damaging. It weakens institutional capacity and diverts government attention, funding, and equipment away from agriculture and locust management. Indirect insecurity may be “active,” when ongoing conflict or unrest occurs outside the breeding zones but during a locust outbreak, or “inactive,” when the after-effects of previous conflicts persist. The latter often manifests as degraded infrastructure, damaged equipment, looted or repurposed vehicles, land mines, and chronically underfunded systems due to prolonged neglect during times of instability. Because conflict is frequent and protracted in many affected regions, both forms of indirect insecurity remain widespread and enduring, further compromising the effectiveness of locust management efforts. As a result, outbreaks can expand unchecked across borders, overwhelming control capacities and threatening food security. Moreover, the diversion of resources and institutional focus from agriculture to emergency or defense priorities further weakens early warning systems, creating conditions for locust outbreaks to escalate into crises.

Real world examples

Personal experiences of those involved in desert locust research and control illustrate how frequently insecurity affects field operations in affected regions. For example, Allan Showler writes about how he encountered multiple war-related evacuations, aerial attacks, and minefield risks while conducting locust surveys in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and even came under small arms fire during aerial surveillance near the Somali border. Other incidents across North and West Africa exposed personnel to riots, terrorist attacks, and armed rebellions. In one case, scientists working in Niger were attacked by armed assailants, resulting in a fatality, while a subsequent insurrection in the early 1990s severely disrupted locust monitoring and control efforts in that region. Over the past three decades, fatal attacks on locust control personnel have occurred across a wide region from Western Sahara to eastern Ethiopia. Lingering or unresolved tensions between neighboring countries, such as those between Eritrea and Ethiopia during peacetime or between India and Pakistan, can still hinder effective surveillance and control activities. (and sources therein) A study of Kenya’s response to the 2019–2021 desert locust invasion found that 75.6 percent of participants identified insecurity, primarily linked to banditry, as a major obstacle to effective locust management.

Read about Michel Lecoq’s experience in Niger in 1991, where he experienced the risks of political insecurity, remote field conditions, and the unexpected violence that disrupted a scientific expedition in the Sahara.

Michel's blog articles Operation GOELAN and Extreme fatigue

Country overviews

Below are some extremely simplified overviews of the countries in which insecurity is particularly important regarding desert locust management.

Algeria

Algeria’s main desert locust risk is concentrated in the south, but prolonged internal violence and political paralysis have often posed a greater challenge than the pest itself. Direct unrest, especially in southern areas, and broader political instability restricted travel, weakened governance, and limited the country’s ability to maintain effective locust surveillance and control, even though major outbreaks were not common in the main breeding zones during that period.

Chad

Chad's locust breeding areas in the remote Tibesti and Ennedi mountains have been repeatedly inaccessible due to direct conflict, including Libya's 1970s annexation attempt, civil war in Tibesti, and chronic rebel activity that halted control operations through the 1986–1989 campaign and beyond. Indirect insecurity from chronic coups, eastern border clashes with Sudan-supported rebels, Central African Republic tensions, and repeated rebel offensives into the capital have severely weakened government capacity, diverting resources and sustaining national instability that undermines locust surveillance and response.

Egypt

Terrorism (e.g. 1986 to 2002) created travel and security concerns, but locust surveillance and control were still able to proceed effectively in the outbreak described.

Eritrea

Eritrea's Red Sea coastal plains, one of the world's most prolific desert locust breeding areas, were inaccessible during the 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia, enabling the 1986–1989 plague and 1992–1994 upsurge to develop unchecked. Persistent direct insecurity from minefields, Sudan border tensions, Hanish Islands conflict with Yemen, and the 1998–2000 border war with Ethiopia, including airstrikes and invasions, continued to block access and disrupt operations, while indirect effects like post-war unpreparedness and chronic military mobilization have prevented full locust control capacity even during later outbreaks through 2020.

Eritrea

Armed conflict, border tensions, and land mines repeatedly blocked access to key breeding areas and contributed to major locust upsurges and large-scale losses in control capacity. Ethiopia: Ethiopia's Ogaden Desert, a key desert locust breeding area, has faced direct insecurity from ongoing rebellions and banditry since 1986, including a 1992 surveillance helicopter shootdown that killed three and small-arms fire against low-flying operations. Indirect insecurity from chronic civil unrest, ethnic clashes, disputed elections, border tensions with Sudan and Kenya, military interventions in Somalia, and states of emergency (e.g., 2016 protests in Oromia and Amhara regions killing hundreds) has persistently strained resources and governance, likely impairing locust management capacity despite some recent control successes.

India-Pakistan border

India-Pakistan's Thar Desert, the easternmost key desert locust breeding area, experienced no direct insecurity in the breeding zones from 1986-2020, allowing effective control during the 1986-1989 and 1992-1994 campaigns before swarms spread. However, indirect insecurity from mutual hostility, limited cross-border communication and travel, landmines, and the Kashmir-focused nuclear arms race and skirmishes complicated cooperation, though both nations retained strong unilateral locust management capacity compared to other affected countries.

Libya

Libya's secondary desert locust breeding areas in the southern desert faced no major outbreaks from 1986-2002, but international isolation from U.S. confrontations (1986 Gulf of Sidra clashes and Tripoli/Benghazi airstrikes) and UN sanctions (1992-1999 over Lockerbie) severely limited external aid, weak infrastructure, and a fragile agricultural ministry, making any potential outbreak response highly problematic. Mali: Mali's Adrar des Iforas, a key desert locust breeding area in the north, has faced direct insecurity from Tuareg rebellions since the early 1990s—including a 1994 attack that killed five troops escorting a surveillance team—and later al-Qaeda kidnappings, a 2012 coup, MNLA/Islamist seizures of the north, and French intervention in 2013, all severely restricting access and operations through 2016.

Mauritania

Mauritania's extensive desert, favorable for desert locust breeding during major episodes like 1986–1989, 1992–1994, and 2003–2005, saw operations occasionally hindered by landmines that have since been largely cleared, enabling reasonably effective control from 2007–2020. Indirect insecurity from 1989–1991 ethnic violence with Senegal, al-Qaeda attacks and kidnappings since 2007, and Western Sahara border tensions likely had only low to moderate impacts on locust management capacity.

Niger

Niger's Aïr Mountains and Tamesna region, key desert locust breeding areas inhabited by Tuareg, faced direct insecurity from Tuareg insurrection and banditry that hindered surveillance and control through 1994—including a 1991 armed attack on scientists that killed one. Indirect insecurity was less severe than in neighboring Mali due to more conciliatory government responses and some rebel disarmament by the late 1990s, allowing unimpeded locust operations from 2007–2016.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's key desert locust breeding areas along the Tihama, Rub al-Khali, and north-central desert faced no direct insecurity, with the country conducting effective unilateral surveillance and control. Indirect insecurity from external conflicts (Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen) and limited urban terrorism had negligible impact on locust management capacity.

Somalia

Somalia's northern breeding areas, problematic especially in 2020, have seen national locust control capacity eliminated since the 1980s due to state collapse, clan warfare, al-Shabaab control, foreign interventions, and chronic direct insecurity, relying instead on minimal UN/FAO surveillance and aerial missions. Indirect insecurity from decades of civil war, failed UN/US peacekeeping, fragmented regional governments, arms embargoes, Ethiopian incursions, and widespread landmines/piracy/banditry has compounded the crisis, making Somalia arguably the most problematic country for desert locust management through 2020.

Sudan

Sudan's Red Sea coastal plain (Tokar Delta to Eritrea) and western desert, prolific locust breeding areas, have faced direct insecurity from civil war, Beja Congress rebels holding key zones, and Egypt's contestation of Halaib, allowing swarms to escape during 1986–1989, 1992–1994, and 1997–1998 outbreaks. Indirect insecurity from decades of southern civil war, Darfur genocide by Janjaweed/RSF militias, post-2011 North-South conflicts, multiple insurgencies, and international isolation (e.g., 1997 U.S. strike) severely strained resources, yet control operations have been substantial and effective since 2003 despite persistent violence.

Western Sahara

Western Sahara's contested status, with Morocco controlling most territory and Polisario guerrillas active since 1975, has made direct locust operations unfeasible, exemplified by a 1988 U.S. C-130 spray plane downed by Polisario missile, and forced tracking of swarms from Mauritania/Algeria until they crossed into safer areas during major campaigns. Indirect insecurity from Morocco-Algeria tensions, Polisario prisoner holdings, ceasefire violations, al-Qaeda kidnappings, uncleared landmines, and lack of functional government mirrors Somalia's challenges, requiring external interventions for any future control assuming access is possible.

Yemen

Yemen's Tihama and Hadramawt regions, primary desert locust breeding areas, have faced direct insecurity since 1986 from chronic tribal/clan conflicts, border disputes with Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda attacks (including USS Cole bombing), Houthi insurgencies, and the 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention, all exacerbating outbreaks like 1986–1989. Indirect insecurity from ubiquitous firearms (3 per citizen), arms bazaars, foreign hostage-taking, six Houthi wars, Arab Spring collapse of government/army, ISIS/al-Qaeda territorial gains, and massive infrastructure destruction has crippled national surveillance and control capacity through 2020.

Other desert locust afflicted countries struggling with insecurity include Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

Role of conflict in recent outbreaks

The recent desert locust upsurge began in the remote Rub al Khali 'Empty Quarter' of Saudi Arabia in 2018, where unusually wet conditions allowed locusts to breed undetected and then spread outward across the region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan were able to mount substantial control efforts, but Somalia and Yemen were far less effective because armed conflict, insecurity, weak governance, and in Somalia’s case landmines, severely constrained surveillance and response. As a result, these two countries became major sources of swarms that kept the upsurge moving into East Africa and South and Southwest Asia, affecting at least 22 countries and requiring spraying across roughly 2.8 million hectares by May 2020.

Reliable forecasting in neighboring stable countries enables prepositioning resources to intercept swarms crossing from inaccessible zones. Past multinational efforts like the now-defunct Maghrebian Strike Force (MSF), funded by CLCPANO members (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia), Islamic Development Bank, and FAO, operated in Mauritania and Mali during the 1990s but remained vulnerable to the same threats as national teams.

Other organizations like DLCO-EA avoid war zones entirely, with many members (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda) chronically underfunded. The newer Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Western Region (CLCPRO), established 2016 with 10 member countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia), maintains a $6.5 million regional fund for proactive control during invasions.

Insecurity poses a large, varied challenge to desert locust control in breeding areas, affecting 77% of the13 example countries (e.g., chronic, multi-conflict cases in Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Chad) via direct obstructions and unmeasured indirect impacts. While creative measures may enable some management in conflict zones, operations remain impeded; thus, risk planning should better account for insecurity with realistic mitigations.